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Abstract 
In introducing the present issue, I clarify in which sense knowledge and philosophy 
can discriminate and marginalize some individuals. In the first part, I focus on the 
traditional exclusion of women from philosophy and explore some feminist projects 
of re-reading the philosophical canon. In my analysis, I pay particular attention to the 
gender gap in philosophy and the so-called “demographic problem” in academia. In 
the second part, I examine the best practices for remedying these forms of injustice and 
promoting diversity in philosophy. 
As various feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science have ar-
gued, our practices of knowledge attribution, acquisition, and justification can 
systematically disadvantage women and other subordinated groups. In fact, 
dominant knowledge practices can discriminate individuals in different ways: 
by excluding them from inquiry; denying them epistemic authority, denigrating 
their modes of knowledge; elaborating theories that depict them as inferior or 
deviant; devolving social theories that make gendered power relations invisible; 
strengthening gender bias and social hierarchies. our scientific practices can 
marginalize certain social groups even when they do not take sufficient account 
of the economic-social impacts and consequences their theories may have on the 
lives of individuals that belong to those categories1. The failure to integrate some 
individuals into the knowledge processes often reflects even an inequality of the 
opportunities to access economic resources and reinforces social advantages2. This 
kind of marginalization takes on – many feminists point out – the characters of 
1 Fine 2010. 
2 harding 1986. 
4discrimination because it excludes certain groups and social categories from the 
enjoyment of some fundamental rights3. Furthermore, science may be hopelessly 
sexist: it may fuel certain stereotypes, strengthen gender bias, devalue  women’s 
participation or interests and deny their point of views4. In order to promote a 
conscious knowledge of the prejudices that it might be based on and encourage 
an awareness of the injustices that knowledge might generate, the questions we 
need to ask are: when we talk of knowledge, whose knowledge are we talking 
about5? namely, what kind of epistemic subject are we referring to6? All humans? 
Men or women? westerners? In wider terms, whose knowledge counts?
In what follows, my aim is provide the reader with an overview of such and 
similar questions by exploring how and what we should do in order to promote 
diversity and inclusiveness in knowledge. More precisely, I will be focusing on 
the issue of diversity and inclusiveness within philosophy with respect to those 
strategies and best practices (i) to improve the climate in the field for women, 
people of colour, and other underrepresented groups; and (ii) to decrease the 
effects of biases more generally. Before doing that, in the next paragraph, I will 
consider the traditional exclusion of women from philosophy and the negative 
characterization of the feminine offered by the western tradition.
1. The philosophical canon and the canon revision
The idea that women and men are vastly different, physically and physi-
ologically, is widespread among ordinary people. Traits such as chromosomes, 
genitalia, body size and strength typically – we believe – contrast between 
genders. Also, psychological attributes are commonly thought to determine 
our membership in a gender and make us different: men are strong, active and 
independent; women are emotional, passive and cooperative. This stereotypical 
and fake picture dominates popular mass media too: men are often portrayed 
as more competitive than women; women as more nurturing than men. yet, it 
is often argued that women and men communicate and think very differently: 
while women regulate their actions by the arbitrary inclinations and opinions, 
men use logic to solve problems.
Although not as widely accepted universally among philosophers, this 
view – which argues that women and men are very different and takes femi-
ninity as the mark that qualifies women – is also extensively held within the 
3 Tuana 1989.
4 Longino and Doell 1983.
5 harding 1991.
6 nelson 1990.
5western philosophical tradition7. As it is well known, at least since the time of 
Plato, the woman is portrayed as inferior to the man or as an incomplete man. 
Several canonical philosophers argue explicitly that rationality is masculine 
and associated to men. Along the line of this prospective, rationality needs to 
be defined in contrast to femininity: women are portrayed as emotional, more 
intuitive than men, guided by feeling and not by reason. According to that 
tradition, women were generally seen as irrational and therefore not made for 
activities such as science and philosophy. In addition, there are no women in 
philosophy or – if there are any – they are unimportant. Along the line of this 
thought, as several feminist philosophers highlight, philosophical norms like 
“reason”, “objectivity” or “rationality” are traditionally associated to maleness 
and defined in contrast to femininity. Thus, one of the most important aims of 
some feminist projects was (and still is) to challenge the negative and oppressive 
characterization of “woman” and “feminine” that the philosophical tradition, 
implicitly or explicitly, has offered. Thus, many feminist philosophers have 
criticized the historical exclusion of women from philosophy by showing that 
the philosophical picture this tradition gives us is incomplete: women are not 
absent ‘in the history of philosophy’ and we should add them to the “canon”. 
Still, several feminist philosophers claim, the canonical tradition is conceptually 
flawed and biased because it relies on gendered notions8. In short, feminists’ 
conclusion is that the absence of women in the canonical tradition is the effect 
of gender bias and social-political discrimination: women were excluded also 
because in the past they were not allowed to pursue university studies.
Thus, the question of the canon is a major concern in feminist theory. A core 
idea shared by most feminist projects is that most of the canonical philosophical 
notions require critical analysis. By and large, feminist philosophers are engaged 
in the project of re-reading the philosophical canon and re-writing the history 
of philosophy. But, what is exactly a philosophical canon and what does it mean 
to re-form or extend it? what criterion should justify the choice of a particular 
canon or a canonical philosopher? 
There is a genuinely disagreement among feminists concerning how to evaluate 
the entire western philosophical tradition and the criteria of interpretation we 
should use for its evaluation. As a consequence, there is no unity in the feminist 
canon revision. Continental and analytic feminist philosophers, in fact, inter-
pret the tradition from two distinct perspectives. Many continental feminists 
think that gender is a useful notion to apply to the history of philosophy. From 
this perspective, our tradition is conceptually flawed because its core concepts 
(“reason”, “objectivity”, “truth”, “logical consistency”, “justice”, etc.) are all male 
7 Lloyd 1993, 2000, 2002; Tuana 1992; witt 1996, 2006, 2007.
8 It is known that many feminists have widely criticized the association of reason with men 
and nature with women.
6gendered and therefore not useful for the feminist purposes. Consequently, we 
should reject the philosophical tradition so far and think of the main canonical 
philosophers (Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Quine, and so on) as sexist. By contrast, 
feminist philosophers in the analytic legacy disagree and consider many tradi-
tional philosophical notions as valuable. More specifically, these notions are not 
in themselves “masculinist” – even though they have often been misinterpreted 
or distorted within that analytic tradition itself – and do not necessarily carry 
gender implications. Rather, analytic methods and concepts – like the use of 
logical notions and linguistic analysis – can be significant to counter sexism 
and androcentrism. The logical and linguistic analysis can provide us – analytic 
feminists argue – rational and objective basis (i) to show that some views about 
women or oppressive to women are deeply mistaken and, consequently, (ii) that 
they should be rejected. Moreover, according to this approach, it is possible to 
consider traditional philosophical notions as concerning gender from a neutral 
point of view. If so, then the feminist canon revision should re-conceptualize 
notions as “reason” or “objectivity” rather than reject them. 
yet, what does it mean for a concept or a notion to be gendered? The issue of 
how to define gendered notions is a disputed topic within feminists philosophy 
and feminists mean by gendered notions or concepts different things. 
To uncover the gender bias in the philosophical tradition, according to Char-
lotte witt, we should distinguish between extrinsically and intrinsically gendered 
notions. Following this distinction, an intrinsically gendered notion «is one that 
necessarily carries implications regarding gender»9, namely it is a «notion that 
is connected with gender and sexual difference»10. For example, one might say 
that Aristotle’s notions of “form” and “matter” reflect sexual differences: the 
former is intrinsically linked to “being male” and latter to “being feminine”. 
This gender association poses a problem for feminists: Aristotelian matter and 
form are not treated as equal and the form has priority over the matter. If so, 
we might conclude, the sexism of the distinction between form and matter is 
inherent to Aristotle’s metaphysic. 
By the contrast, witt notes, an extrinsically gendered notion is «typically 
does carries implications concerning gender, but not necessarily so»11. Some 
feminist philosophers have argued that, for example, the distinction Aristotle 
makes between form and matter is not intrinsically connected with gender dif-
ferences and, even if it is, this sex distinction is not necessarily involved in the 
rest of Aristotle’s theories. If this is correct, we might evaluate Aristotle’s theories 
differently and think that not all his theses have to be rejected because they are 
not intrinsically biased against women. Rather, we might state that Aristotle’s 
9 witt 2007; 2004: 8.
10 Ibidem.
11 witt 2004.
7texts are misogynist (because of what he said on women was simply mistaken 
or false) but take most Aristotle’s theories as not necessarily connected to what 
he said on women. Consequently, we might just ignore his considerations on 
women but argue that his other theses could be of value for feminist purposes. 
otherwise, Sally haslanger has argued that saying that a concept is masculine 
or feminine does not simply mean that the concept is gendered because of its 
association with men or women. More specifically, we are not simply saying 
that – since Plato – rationality has been associated with the male and irrationality 
with the female. If it were so, it would be easy to eliminate this gender associa-
tion and argue that the sexism of the canonical tradition is not intrinsic to, for 
example, the account of rationality the tradition has offered. Thus, we cannot 
just say that the femininity notion the tradition offers to us is mistaken. Rather, 
haslanger notes, norms are gendered «by providing ideals that are appropriate 
to the roles constituting gender»12. If a notion is gendered or not depends on 
how we defend genders. Let us consider the notion of rationality or reason. In 
order to say that this notion is gendered, we should first examine how the ide-
als of rationality are grounded (or not) in gender. According to haslanger, we 
should define genders in terms of social relations. Following her, concepts or 
notions are gendered «insofar as they function as appropriate norms or ideals 
for those who stand in these social relations»13.
Let us go back now to the issue mentioned above on the theoretical aspects of 
gender disparity in philosophy. The main questions that arise are: are feminists 
right or does the gender gap in philosophy really reflect systematic differences 
in the way individuals belong to different genders are or think? And, if there are 
indeed systematic differences among women and men, might this explain why 
few women are working in academia? And how can we make gender equality 
a concrete reality in philosophy? In what follows, I will focus on the under-
representation of women in philosophy departments.
2. The exclusion of women from the Philosophers’ Club
Despite some serious affirmative efforts, as is well known, few women achieve 
high academic positions in philosophy faculties, and academic authorities often 
automatically consider men as the first candidates for posts of responsibility14. 
12 haslanger 1993: 217. 
13 Ibidem.
14 Data indicating the number and percentages of women in the leading Philosophy Depart-
ments (in the uS, the uK, Australia, Canada and new Zealand) are available on the website 
Philosophical Gourmet Report (http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/) or on PhilPaper (http://
philpapers.org/surveys/). Also see haslanger 2008. According to these data, men make up almost 
80 percent of faculty staff (Lecturers, Senior Lecturers, Readers and Professors). The Joint Brit-
8what are the causes of this gender disparity? Do women dislike rigours argu-
mentation or simply are less interested than men in philosophy? Do gender 
differences help explain the gender gap in philosophy departments? 
In recent years, in particular in the united States of America and northern 
europe, there has been an increasing debate over the causes of gender inequali-
ties in academia15. This debate aims at addressing the issue of why philosophy 
(as a discipline and a profession) seems to have a problem specifically with 
gender disparity more than other scientific fields. This debate raises the ques-
tion of whether the gender gap in philosophy is (i) a phenomenon that has to 
do with the fact that the discipline is still mostly thought, even by professional 
philosophers, as an expression of that rationality of which men would be by 
nature more capable than women; or (ii) a phenomenon that concerns not only 
cultural and social facts but also the discipline in itself. More precisely, some 
philosophers argue that some features of philosophy as a discipline, for example 
some of its argumentative models or the nature of the issues addressed, might be 
inherently discriminatory and that philosophy might (as a discipline) implicitly 
reinforce gender inequalities. 
As Marina Sbisà illustrates in her contribution on the controversial debate 
over the underrepresentation of women in philosophy and what we should do 
to actively challenge gender disparity, Louise Antony distinguishes two different 
approaches to analyse and contrast women discrimination: “Different Voices” 
(according to which women are discriminated in philosophy because of their 
difference) and “Perfect Storm” (according to which such discrimination is caused 
by a combination of independent factors). According to Antony, the first model 
is committed to «the antecedent existence of intrinsic gender differences»16; 
the second model is the one we ought to adopt: it «seeks to explain women’s 
low representation within philosophy as a kind of interaction effect among 
familiar kinds of sex discrimination that are operative throughout society, but 
that take on particular forms and force as they converge within the academic 
institution of philosophy»17. Among the independent factors that play a role 
in the “Perfect Storm”, Sbisà argues in defending Anthony’s picture, there are 
also some “internal” aspects of the relationship between being a woman and 
ish Philosophical Association/Swip uK Committee for women in Philosophy also published a 
report on gender imbalance in the uK: http://www.swipuk.org/notices/2011-09-08/. For more 
data on gender schemas and the accumulation of advantage, see the gender tutorial site at http://
www.hunter.cuny.edu/gendertutorial/aboutus.html. on gender equity and why so few women 
are at the top of their profession, see Valian 1998, 2005. on data about the situation in Italy, 
see Sbisà in this volume. 
15 Antony 2012; haslanger 2008; Valian 2005.
16 Antony 2012: 229. 
17 Ivi: 231.
9doing philosophy («such as the normative role of gender stereotypes, the role 
of care-giving in society […], women’s difficult path towards the indispensable 
condition of being autonomous subjects and agents»). 
Indeed, our profession does not represent the diversity of our current popu-
lation. This discriminatory situation is extremely serious at present and affects 
not only women but also other marginalized social groups. This is what Linda 
Alcoff18 calls the “demographic problem” in philosophy, namely the problem of 
representation and marginalization in the discipline. As we have noted above, 
the issue of diversity and inclusion in philosophy is indeed an internal matter 
to the discipline, since it deals with some forms of resistance. As Shannon Dea 
explains, canonical philosophers (such like Aristotle, Augustine, hume, Spinoza, 
and Schopenhauer) deprecated not only women’s capacity for reason, but also 
the rational capacity of various radicalized groups (Blacks, Latinos) or disabled 
people. Consequently, in order to fight the marginalization and exclusion of 
all minorities, we should review our philosophical pedagogy and methodology 
by taking diversity seriously in our professional practices and creating welcom-
ing cultures that value inclusion. Following her suggestion, our pedagogy and 
philosophical methodology should be informed and enriched by insights from 
“deep pluralism”. unfortunately, things are not so easy and changes are not 
always instantaneous or easy to reach. As we said, there are internal obstacles 
that prevent the practical efforts to positively (and concretely) respond to the 
“demographic problem”. In order to clarify the phenomenon of minorities’ 
marginalization, Ian James Kidd analyses the different forms of resistance and 
suggests a typology of resisters (the naïf, the conservative, the proud, the hos-
tile) – viz. generalised types of person who resists to the efforts «of those trying 
to introduce ameliorative measures» – by mapping their modes of resistance. 
In what follows, we will briefly see how these forms of resistance are also 
deeply embedded in the way we come to exercise (or fail to come) authority 
and linked to the linguistic discrimination.
2.1 Trust, authority, and speech acts
Another fundamental question in the debate on discrimination in philosophy 
and one of the main topics currently discussed is the related issue: how can we 
challenge the narrowness of what is understood as “philosophical knowledge” 
and how “good knowledge” is evaluated? Should the concept of knowledge be 
considered in connection with notions such as trust, reliance and testimony? 
Should we need to re-imagine what “authority”, “credibility” or “testimony” 




Some answers to these questions are the focus of the contributions from Fiona 
Jenkins and Jacopo Domenicucci. In the context of the gender equity debate, 
Jenkins offers an accurate depiction of the relevant and interesting critical insights 
on some of the major themes in recent debates on women’s discrimination in 
philosophy, namely the relation between women’s marginalization and the ways 
in which we measure excellence and quality in our discipline. The phenomenon 
of discrimination against women in philosophy and the under-representation of 
women in academia is also linked to the rankings of excellence and peer review 
processes. She proposes «an approach based in efforts to engage in socio-political 
regulation of discrimination» and shows how this regulation might inform and 
enrich our discipline and profession. In his contribution, Domenicucci shows 
the relation between trust, agency and discrimination, which is central to ethics 
and social ontology. he introduces a non-merely epistemic notion of trust by 
sketching a grammar of discrimination and shows how this might provide a 
better insight into a much-debated point in the epistemic injustice literature, 
namely what is distinctively morally harmful in discriminatory lack of trust 
and distrust. 
As is well known, discrimination can take many forms and have different 
pathways leading to different results. As John Austin has argued, speech may 
constitute and cause subordination. Contributions from Claudia Bianchi, Bianca 
Cepollaro and Laura Caponetto respectively address the recent controversial 
debate over how language reflects and perpetuates subordination. In particu-
lar, they examine the ways in which language spreads discrimination. Bianchi 
focuses on hate speech by addressing the main objection to accounts of hate 
speech in terms of illocutionary speech acts, that is the Authority Problem and 
paying the attention to the social status of both the speaker and the audience. 
The subordinate acts are not made in a sort of social vacuum. Rather, they are 
made in a wider network of oppressive (cultural, social, economic and political) 
practices. In line with this perspective, Cepollaro maintains that given a presup-
positional account of slurs we can make sense of their extra-linguistic effects 
on discrimination and shows how such analysis offers a good explanation of 
other non-linguistic phenomena. Slurs differ from other expressives (like “jerk”, 
“asshole”) and differ from explicit discriminatory statements. The best way to 
respond to hate speech and to mitigate their dangerous consequences is, Cepol-
laro highlights, to make explicit the derogatory content of epithets and then 
reject it. Caponetto instead examines pornography as a practice of discrimina-
tion based on sex that causes the silencing and subordination of women. As 
is known, according to Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon (1988), 
pornography can be defined as a systematic practice of discrimination on the 
basis of sex. Pornography may silence women by causing their speech act of 
sexual refusal to fail to be understood, or to be misunderstood. Caponetto clari-
fies this debate (i) by discussing the thesis according to which women’s refusals 
fail because «men don’t recognize women’s authority»; and (ii) by showing why 
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this account should be rejected and (iii) presenting an alternative account of 
the failure of women’s refusals (according to which women’s refusals fail because 
men «ascribe to themselves the authority to order»). 
3. Can we remedy these forms of injustice? Some best practices to promote equality 
in philosophy19. 
In the light of what has been pointed out the following question can be 
made: what needs to change in our knowledge practices and profession? As 
several feminist philosophers maintain, we should take affirmative steps to-
wards diversifying at two different levels: through the training of women and 
underrepresented minority philosophers, and through hiring and promotion 
practices. At the same time, we should also shape in a different way the intel-
lectual community and improve the work environment in our departments. For 
example, we should (i) integrate information about implicit bias and stereotype 
threat (and explain how to avoid them) into our teaching methods course for 
students, and (ii) explore new approaches to teaching that might prove more 
inclusive. In order to address the problems affecting diversity in the philosophical 
profession, many philosophers argue, we should explore potential solutions20. 
At the same time, we should encourage a supportive atmosphere and enforce 
policies prohibiting all forms of discrimination (like as harassment and inap-
propriate behaviour in the workplace) and assist members of the community 
in addressing these problems. 
In the next paragraphs, I shall not address the issue of what causes gender 
gap in philosophy or the under-representation of women in philosophy depart-
ments, nor of how philosophy cannot be neutral with respect to gender and 
discriminate against certain social groups. Rather, I will explore some proposals 
and best practices that aim at finding a solution or at least mitigate the gender 
gap in philosophy and promoting a greater presence and participation of women 
(and marginalized groups) in academia. In what follows, precisely, I present an 
overview about (some of ) simple things we could do to promote the full inclu-
sion of minorities in careers in a field such as philosophy and achieving gender 
equality in academia21. As we will see, to encourage (or raise the awareness on) 
19 See Feminist Philosophers Blog: “10 small things you can do to promote gender equality 
in Philosophy”, https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/ten-small-things-you-
can-do-topromote-gender-equityin-philosophy. 
20 In some departments, there has been curated a collection of information and resources on such 
issues in the Climate section of their web page, under the links on implicit bias, stereotype threat. For 
example, see the Rutgers Collection at: https://philosophy.stanford.edu/groups/women-philosophy. 
21 I borrow some of the suggestions proposed here: https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.
com/2010/01/04/ten-small-things-you-can-do-topromote-gender-equityin-philosophy.
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gender equality in philosophy, some authors have suggested some practices and 
behaviours that we should concretely follow or take to improve the climate in 
the field for women and underrepresented groups, and promote diversity and 
pluralism in philosophy.
(i) Organizing conferences and seminars. Some philosophers suggest that, in 
organizing a conference or workshop, we should invite as experts not only male 
speakers. As research has shown, when planning a convention, the organizer 
might be strongly influenced (or affected) by gender in the choice of the guests. 
Some evidence suggests that what motivates this choice lies in the fact that 
competence and epistemic authority are commonly attributed mainly to men 
or some social categories22. Implicit biases impact, consciously or unconsciously, 
our choices23. As some studies show, normally we prefer a man to a woman as 
an expert; in some cases we prefer a man even when his resume is qualitatively 
less competitive or prestigious than that of a woman. women are often victims 
of this prejudices and psychological mechanisms. how can we then correct this 
discriminatory behaviour? Since these are mechanisms that sometimes act in an 
unconscious way, there is no escaping that risk. To draw up a more equitable list 
of possible invited experts, an aid may come from “The uPDirectory database” 
(Directory of Philosophers from underrepresented Groups in Philosophy)24, 
where one can find lots of information on women or people from minority 
groups working in or out of the academy with reference to their philosophical 
competence and specialization area. This database is a useful tool for those who 
would like to invite a woman (or a member of minority groups) to a conference 
but do not know which women (or member of minority groups) work on the 
topic of the event that they want to plan. This database has been thought with 
the aim of limiting some of the negative effects of implicit prejudices that are 
often the cause of women’s poor visibility in academy. In addition, to support 
greater visibility of women, one good thing to do might be to organize at one’s 
own department a conference or a meeting over the issue of the gender equality 
and mechanisms that influence our choices. 
(ii) Attending conferences and seminars. what can we do in practice when 
we are participating in a conference with only male speakers in the program? 
when we participate as speaker to a conference where all the speakers (or most 
of them) are males, we should report to the organizers the absence of women 
(o minority group). But, how should we report it? The suggestion is to “say 
something” about it in a way that is comfortable for us. The report should not 
be controversial but constructive. The best attitude is to make positive com-
ments, be ironic and not aggressive towards the organizers. As pointed out by 
22 Fricker 2007.
23 McGlone and Aronson 2006.
24 See here: http://www.theupdirectory.com/.
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Jennifer Saul (2014), we should remember that one might have a prejudice 
against someone without being aware of it. In fact, no one seems to be immune 
to prejudices, even those who share democratic beliefs or have egalitarian ide-
als. As Saul argues, therefore, we should not necessarily blame those who have 
gender bias since – in some cases – they might be not able to realize this nor be 
guilty for having been educated in a sexist society. Such prejudiced judgments, 
especially when they are unconscious, may therefore not always be rejected. At 
least, one can mitigate their harmful and damaging effects. hence, the more 
aware we are of these mechanisms, the more possibility there is that we can 
handle them. In line with this perspective, some philosophers have engaged the 
so-called “Gendered Conference Campaign”25, through which they contact the 
organizing Committee of the conference where there are no women among 
the participants in order to report this exclusion.
(iii) Editing a volume or a special issue. when one is editing a volume or a 
special issue of a scientific journal, she or he should not forget to invite women 
to write a contribution. The best thing would be involving the same number of 
people in relation to their gender or minority memberships. 
iv) Teaching. when one gives a course, she or he should include in the program 
books or papers written also by women. This effort should be made – compatibly 
with the course taught – with the aim to offer to the students contributions by 
women and show them that also a woman can be a good philosopher. Despite 
the fact that today many women philosophers publish with prestigious publish-
ers and on major scientific journals, they are not always included in the syllabi. 
This exclusion has the effect of reinforcing the false belief that women are not 
good at philosophy and that rational thinking is not appropriate for women 
or that philosophy is the expression only of male thought. Besides, including 
contributions of women in programs and discussing them during the class 
means presenting to female students a possible (an alternative) woman’s model 
to emulate. when this occurs, many more female students decide (at the end 
of their studies) to pursue a college career or start a Ph.D. 
v) Reviewing contributions for scientific journals. If you are part of the edito-
rial staff of a scientific journal or a member of its Scientific Committee, you 
should insist that the so-called blind review is practiced during the evaluation 
of a paper. As some data show, when the review is not anonymous, papers writ-
ten by women are rejected at the first instance. This happens even for articles 
written by philosophers from universities considered less prestigious. namely, 
the paper submitted to a journal by a man or someone who carries out his\
her research activities in a university such as oxford tends to be taken more 
seriously compared to the contributions submitted by a woman or a researcher 
25 To learn more about it, see the link at: https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/gendered-
conference-campaign/.
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from not so famous a university. even in this case, there is a bias in favour of 
important names and well-known philosophers (to whom we tend to be more 
benevolent with respect to objections that could be raised). Thus, anonymous 
review makes the evaluation process fairer both for women and for who belongs 
to certain social categories.
vi) Giving credit to the scientific contribution of women. we should have the 
habit of always giving credit to the work of a woman. According to some data, 
there is some reluctance to pay tribute to the scientific contribution made by 
a woman. This reticence has also to do with the different ways in which men 
behave during philosophical discussions. Many women have the tendency to be 
less bright during a talk in public or less involved in a philosophical discussion 
in a workshop. During a seminar or a conference, for example, women tend to 
make few questions or raise few objections. In order to eradicate this practice, 
during a seminar or conference, we should publicly say that the contribution 
that a woman is giving to the discussion is good (when it is so) and point it out 
to others participants (when they do not do it). here too, the suggestion is to 
recognize the merit of a woman to participation in the philosophical debate in 
a way that is more suitable to us. For example, in a case such as the context of 
a seminar, one might think of – if she or he takes the floor – to anticipate what 
we have to say by making a remark like: “Maria was rightly stating something 
like this before …”. This is important for stimulating women’s participation in 
the discussion. Another good practice is, when one is the chair in a discussion 
after a talk, to give first the floor to a woman. This encourages more women to 
raise their hands and make questions. 
vii) Speaking of the bias phenomenon. Since bias and cognitive threat may be 
unconscious, we should discuss with colleagues and students about this phenom-
enon. For there is little awareness of this phenomenon among those who work 
in academia. Therefore, the more people become aware of the phenomenon, the 
more chance we have to counter the harmful consequences stereotypes might have 
on the victims. Recently, in some departments, they have curated a collection of 
information and resources on such issues in the Climate section of their web page, 
under the links on implicit bias, stereotype threat26. Also, there are some blogs 
where women report their experiences of what it means doing philosophy and 
being a woman27. Still, some philosophy departments have started a chapter on 
Minorities and Philosophy28, which aims to understand issues related to minority 
26 For example, see the Rutgers Collection at: https://philosophy.stanford.edu/groups/women-
philosophy. 
27 See “what is it like to be a woman in philosophy?” at: https://beingawomaninphilosophy.
wordpress.com. 
28 To learn more about it, see “women in Philosophy Reading Group” on: https://philosophy.
stanford.edu/groups/women-philosophy.
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participation in academic philosophy and respond to theoretical issues concerning 
philosophy of gender, race, sexual orientation, class, disability.
Are these suggestions sufficient to find a solution for the gender gap in phi-
losophy and promote diversity in philosophy? The answer to that question seems 
obvious. The awareness of the mechanisms that trigger certain prejudices is not 
enough to give to women and marginalized groups the recognition they deserve. 
Moreover, the fact that the activation of implicit stereotypes is often unconscious 
does not guarantee the end of the discriminatory behaviour towards women or 
minorities. As it has been argued, in order to fight culturally certain prejudices, 
a strong motivation is needed. nevertheless, being aware of the mechanisms 
and the way they operate can be very helpful and an important starting point 
to counter (at least in part) the phenomenon of inequality in academy. 
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